This study complements the inclusive growth literature by examining the determinants and consequences of the middle class in a continent where economic growth has been relatively high. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 33 African countries for a 2010 crosssectional study. OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS and SUR estimation techniques are employed to regress a plethora of middle class indicators, notably, the: floating, middle-class with floating, middleclass without floating, lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income categories. Results can be classified into two main strands. First, results on determinants broadly show that GDP per capita and education positively affect all middle class dependent variables. However, we have seen a negative nexus for the effect of ethnic fragmentation, political stability in general and partially for economic vulnerability. Simple positive correlations have been observed for: the size of the informal sector, openness and democracy. Second, on the consequences, the middle class enables the accumulation of human and infrastructural capital, while its effect is null on political stability and democracy in the short-run but positive for governance and modernisation. Policy implications are discussed.
Introduction
'Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer' (Lewis, 1955) . Piketty (2014) has recently joint the stream of authors and shown in his 'capital in the 21 st century' that the Kuznets (1955 Kuznets ( , 1971 conjectures are invalid in developed economies.
Africa's burgeoning growth relative to the rest of the world has been accompanied with concerns of 'immiserizing growth' 1 . A lot has been documented on the need for inclusive development and the imperative of understanding inequality in the poverty-growth nexus (Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007; Thorbecke, 2013) . The narratives have included: the employment of instruments associated with growth elasticity (Adam, 2004) , the relevance of inequality in the fight against poverty (Datt & Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993; Ali & Thorbecke, 2000; Elu, 2013; Mthuli et al., 2014) and the role of income distribution in the effect of growth on poverty (Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Fosu, 2014) .
The above narratives have been substantiated in both developing countries (Fosu, 2010a ) and samples of African (Fosu, 2008 (Fosu, , 2009 (Fosu, , 2010b (Fosu, , 2010c economies. The works are broadly consistent with Lewis (1955) on the need for growth to be inclusive. On more specific notes: "The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty" (Fosu, 2010a (Fosu, , p. 1432 ; "In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth" (Fosu, 2011, p. 11) and; "The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality" (Fosu, 2010c, p. 818) . These conclusions support an evolving stream of literature on inclusive development and success in post-2015 goals 2 .
In light of the above, numerous proposals on development models have been documented recently. Among them, is the Moyo conjecture that is essentially based on an evolving middle-class. According to Moyo (2013) , the middle class is necessary to implement the Washington consensus (WC) which she defines as 'private capitalism, liberal democracy 1 First put forward by Bhagwati (1958) , the concept is one that summarises a situation in which economic growth is accompanied by negative externalities. 2 See, inter alia: Ozgur et al. (2009) , Timmons et al. (2009) , Bagnara (2012) , Monika & Bobbin (2012) , Miller (2014 ) & Singh (2014 .
and priority in political rights'. According to the author, such a middle class can be easily achieved with the Beijing Model (BM), which is defined as 'state capitalism, deemphasised democracy and priority in economic rights'. Hence, while the WC is a model of the long-run, the BM is more appropriate in the short-term to deliver a middle class that would sustainably demand political rights. The intuition behind the conjecture is that, a sustainable middle class is needed to demand political rights in a sustainable manner (Asongu, 2014a; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014) . There is a growing body of literature documenting the Moyo conjecture (Asongu, 2014a; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014) . It should also be noted that this conjecture has already been partially verified in developing (Lalountas et al., 2011) and African (Asongu, 2014b) countries.
But why is the focus on Africa particularly important? In accordance with recent narratives, while overall growth experienced between 1990-2010 has moved hand-in-glove with growing inequality and poverty, some recent works demonstrate that Africa has done relatively better (Young, 2012) , especially in reducing inequality (Fosu, 2014) and is on time in Millennium Development poverty reduction targets (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014) . Hence, Africa is a good candidate on which to investigate determinants and consequences of the middle class.
Graph 1 below illustrates the evolving relationship between of the middle class and income inequalities in Africa. This graph provided by Ncube & Shimeles (2013) 
from
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) micro-data shows that inequality has been rising in the past few years. This recent tendency could be translated by many as the fruits of economic prosperity not trickling down to the poor segments of the population. Conversely, there has been a consistent growth in middle-class income since the year 2000. According to the narrative, most countries that have experienced a substantial growth in the middle-income class have also witnessed burgeoning economic growth in the same periods.
Graph 1: Evolution of Middle class and Inequality
Source : Ncube & Shimeles (2013) In 2010 Consistent with various studies that have emphasised the importance of the middle class, the above variations are expected to wheel changes in Africa from various angles. For example Adelman & Morris (1997) and have provided a historic proof to substantiate that, up till the 19 th century the middle was a major driving force in the development of Europe and North America. Recent discussions have also underlined the important role of the middle class in, inter alia: social progress (Sridharan, 2004) , institutional reforms (Loyza et al., 2012 ), democratic promotion (Petterson, 2007 , inclusive development (Birdsall, 2010) , fight against poverty (Dyan, 1997) and innovation & entrepreneurship (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009 ).
The purpose of this empirical study is to understand the socioeconomic determinants and consequences of the middle class in Africa. This assessment is important in the perspective that it enriches the literature on middle class determinants as well as its characteristics or consequences. The second interest of this study is the employment of original middle class indicators, ad hoc measurements put forward by the African Development Bank (AfDB).
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data while the empirical results are presented in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.
Data

Data description
Middle class
Generally, the middle class could be understood either in absolute or in relative terms.
First, in absolute terms, Bhalla (2009) attributes an annual income of 3900 USD in PPP to the attainment of a middle class. A different view is provided by Banerjee & Duflo (2008) .
According to them, per capita daily expenditure of in-between 6 and 10 USD attributes a middle-class status. While Wheary (2009) have proposed between 2-3 USD per/day, Kohut (2009) an average expenditure of 10 USD, Kharas (2010) has gone much further in proposing a daily expenditure scale of 10 to 100 USD. Second, in relative terms, the middle class can be defined as any household that is situated between 20 and 80e percentile of the consumption distribution (Easterly, 2001) or between 0.75 and 1.25 times the median revenue of the inhabitant in the zone under consideration (Birdsall et al., 2000) .
Since estimations for Africa are not very apparent, we use those proposed by Ncube et al. (2011) and 20 USD. In addition to the discussed three sub-categories, we add two more for robustness purposes, notably: (1) a middle-class without the floating class (MCWFC) and; (2) a middle-class with the floating class (MCWtFC).
The study has made use of the Beta approach in estimating different points on the Lorenz curve showing the proportion of the population and their corresponding portion of national income (Kakwani, 1980) . The equality line represents the situation of perfect equality in a society. The extreme case is one where an individual monopolises all the wealth in the world while the rest of the world is left with no wealth. The Lorenz curve is fundamentally used to represent inequality in income distribution within a population. The distance from the equality line is proportional to the degree of inequality in a given society.
Graph 2 : Lorenz curve
Source : Ncube et al. (2011) In order to determine the three unique values (4$, 10$ & 20$) susceptible of generating the Lorenz curve in Africa (Graph 2), the authors have proceeded in two steps.
In the first-step, the authors estimate the Gini coefficient from a hypothesis of linear tendency between two observations because data on inequality (e.g the Gini index) is scarce.
Hence, the Gini coefficient which measures the level of inequality can be written in function of the Lorenz curve as follows:
Where S i is the trapezium area under the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient represents the proportion of the zone situated between the equality line & the Lorenz curve and the total surface above & below the Lorenz curve.
A system of equations is used in the second-step to estimate a number of points. In the equations presented below, for every African country and for every year, the system of 
Determining factors
Many variables have been documented in the literature to potentially affect the middle class. However, we retain only some of these owing to data availability constraints. The Economic vulnerability (Vulnerabilit) is appreciated by the index proposed by Guillaumont (2008) and updated by Cariolle & Goujon (2013) . The informal economy is estimated by a dynamic approach. This indicator which represents the weight of this sector on GDP is obtained from Schneider et al. (2010) .
Variables of consequence
Openness ( 
Statistical Analysis
Empirical results
Middle class determinants
The basic results are presented in Table 2 Political stability and ethnic fragmentation also fall in the category of estimated coefficients with a negative relationship with the dependent variable. As concerns the former, no major comment is worthwhile because it is not consistently significant across specifications. This is not the case of the latter for which, with a 95% confidence level, ethnic fragmentation is the highest estimated coefficient in terms of magnitude. This result is consistent with a plethora of studies, notably : Ncube & Shimeles (2013) for African data, It is also important to underline that the effect of English common law has not been incorporated to mitigate issues of multicollinearity. It is surprising to notice that the sign associated to French civil law is positive. This is because the studies of La Porta et al. (1998 Porta et al. ( , 1999 Porta et al. ( , 2008 provide English common law countries with an edge in development. This sign is also inconsistent with the estimation of Chun et al. (2011) and recent African studies (Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2012ab) . This contradiction cannot be over emphasised because the sign of the estimated coefficient in the comparative study is not statistically significant.
Education, democracy and development (proxied with per capita GDP) have the expected positive signs. Substantial human capital is necessary to belong to the middle class.
This is consistent with Bledstein (1978) Columns 5 and 6 are concerned with effects on the floating class (FC). Hence, we can confirm that this social category has is significant in influencing how a number of our independent variables behave towards them. Here, we notice two fundamental changes:
democracy is no longer significant while openness benefits this class. The positive role of openness on FC is in accordance with the findings of Dollar & Kraay (2004) . In effect, it
should not be forgotten that this social class is closest to the poor. The insignificance of democracy is surprising.
As we proceed to columns 7-10, the results present a different configuration. Column 8 on the Lower-middle income (LM) has findings that are consistent with those of the second column, with the exception of two aspects. First, the education variable no longer significantly affects the dependent variable. Second, political stability negatively affects this sub-category of the middle class. While the finding is consistent with the ADB (2010), it is surprising to notice that this variable is only significant for LM.
For the last-two columns on Upper-middle class (UM), the following could be established relative to the first-two columns. The insignificant effect of the informal sector on the middle class is no longer significant in the UM. Here the nexus is positively significant.
This finding is inconsistent with the negative effect reported by Rossi et al. (2011) . The
African informal sector appears to offer more opportunities than the formal sector in the perspective that it is easier to progress in the latter. This is justified by the ease of doing business while avoiding taxes (Johnson et al., 1998) . However, it is quite interesting to notice that the positive effect only appears in the UM. Economic vulnerability no longer has a significant effect on this variable. This is logical because as income increases one is less associated with negative economic shocks. The same logic could be extended to the insignificant effects of political stability and democracy. A plethora of studies in empirical literature have attempted to assess this concern, following the works of Easterly (2001) . Accordingly, the problem is evident because while theoretically the level of development has an effect on the middle class, the opposite effect cannot be ruledout. In essence, the literature has documented a relationship flowing from the size of the middle class to economic growth and poverty reduction ).
In order to tackle this concern, GDP per capita has been instrumented with petroleum exports and tropical location. These two variables are borrowed from the literature.
Accordingly, Bloom & Sachs (1998) and Sachs & Warner (1997) have shown that, enclavement and location in the tropics are serious impediments to development. Sachs & Warner (1995) have also been followed by an abundant literature documenting the inconvenient effects of natural resource abundance, notably petroleum (Frankel, 2012; Van der Ploeg, 2011) .
The first instrument is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the country is a petroleum exporter and 0 otherwise. While a dummy on commodity has been instead employed by Easterly (2001) for the first instrument, the second instrument is in accordance with him. It is also a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the latitude of the country is higher than 23 and 0 otherwise. From a practical standpoint, the instruments are valid based on result from the Sargan and Hausman tests. Hence, we can confirm that the positive link from GDP per capita to the middle class is causal and not essentially exploratory. This positive nexus in Africa is consistent with Easterly (2001) . We also notice that the importance of GDP per capita varies across social categories. Apparently, this importance is either of polynomial or quadratic form.
The second block concerns education-related estimations. This variable is instrumented with historical IQ (Intellectual Quotient) and colonial types, notably: English Common law and French civil law countries. Historical IQ is the mean IQ of every country from Lynn (2012) . This indicator has already been employed in many studies (Daniele, 2013; Kodila-Tedika & Cinyabuguma, 2014) . Our hypothesis is a transgenerational type such that the accumulation of human capital depends on the past (t, t N-1 ). Hence, heritage of educational institutions of the present are influenced by intellectuals of the past. As concerns the other instrument, there are a plethora of studies that have established a significant difference in human capital when former colonies of English common law countries are distinguished from their French civil law counterparts (Cogneau, 2003 (Cogneau, , 2012 Cogneau & Moradi, 2013; Huillery, 2009 ). The Sargan overidentification restrictions (OIR) test confirms the validity of this instrument. Like for per capita GDP, the importance of education varies. Accordingly, it is more important for the FC but decreases for MCWtFC and further decreases for the UM.
In the third block on economic vulnerability, the same logic used in the choice of instruments for economic development applies. However, the results are different from those in Table 3 . In fact, we notice that but for the nexus between the LM and vulnerability, the relationships were correlations. These findings are somewhat ambiguous because we expected the vulnerability to first affect the FC before affecting other categories of the middle class. A possible explanation could be limited activities in the FC which gives the impression that this layer of the middle class becomes immune as vulnerability increases. In other words, channels via which vulnerability affects categories in the middle class differ. As concerns political stability, we have used latitudes and types of sponsorships or help from the superpowers during the Cold war. The 'type of sponsorship' has recently been documented as an instrument of institutions by Kodila-Tedika &Tcheta-Bampa (2014). These authors assert that the Cold war has influenced a certain institutional status quo. Accordingly, the specific context of the Cold war has enabled the persistence of colonial institutions for the following reasons. By virtue of their power, the United States (US) was looking for external markets for its products and thus collaborated with past colonial powers which already had some experience in Africa. In return, European industries had to conserve most of their extractive industries. For the accord with the US to be effective, the US had to support nondemocratic elites in countries that experienced natural resource booms during the period of colonisation. The same logic applies for the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). These supports have considerably diminished institutional constraints and politics on African presidents. These circumstances imply the African elite have been confronted with a fundamental arbitrage between weak and strong private property institutions. Hence, the leading elite of states that inherited these extractive institutions are more inclined to weakening property rights if rents from natural resources are substantial. This argument implies the Cold war and corresponding sponsorships by world powers of government elite in the wake of independence, have curtailed the development of private property institutions.
Hence, the initial situations in which African states found themselves have been sustained over the years. Moreover, from a statistical viewpoint, these instruments are not quite useful for the UM, LM and MCWtFC sub-categories of the middle class.
Very surprisingly, after correction for potential biases in endogeneity, political stability appears to be significant for all the dependent variables, with the exception of UM. In other words, for a middle class to exist there is need for a certain political consensus to enable the emergence of such a class. This political stability guarantees the existence and survival of this class. This inference is correct given some recent studies by North et al. (2010) in which the dominant elite (or insiders) regulate violence in order to gain power which enables them to become wealthy while promoting the cooperation with different actors that can break the political equilibrium or stability of social order. As suggested in the estimations, at a certain level, the middle class can do without a political consensus. This threshold appears to be that of the UM, most probably because those belonging to the class must have protection mechanisms.
As concerns democracy, we exploit the same instruments as for political stability.
These instruments are valid from a statistical viewpoint. Hence, one can consider democracy in Africa as major driver of the middle class.
Consequences of the middle class
We borrow from Easterly (2001) in the procedure of estimating consequences of the middle class. We estimate the following system of equations:
Where, Y represents a set of variables to be explained. In the first equation, the endogenous components of the middle class are instrumented with legal origins (English common law and French civil law). X is the set of control variables. In order to avoid a cumbersome exercise, we only report coefficients corresponding to the middle class. From a broad perspective of accumulation, the effects are uniform. Accordingly, the size of the middle class positively affects our indicators of accumulation. We consistently notice a significant relationship at the 99% confidence level. Hence, an increasing middle class positively affects infrastructure, health, education and social protection. An interesting point worth noting is the magnitude of the coefficients. The effects appear to increase with categories in the middle-class. In essence, as the middle class level increases, its effect on the variables increases concurrently. On a whole, irrespective of the econometrics method employed, the results broadly support the hypothesis that an increase in the middle class is associated with higher human capital and infrastructural accumulation.
.2.1 Infrastructure and human capital accumulation in the face of the middle class
Entrepreneurship and the middle class
According to Senauer & Goetz (2003) , the emergence of the middle class creates a lot of opportunities worldwide for consumer commodities. This tendency stimulates diversification to a certain extent. Barnerjee & Duflo (2008) have underlined the nexus between innovation and the middle class on the one hand and, entrepreneurship and the middle class on the other hand.
The emergence of a middle class is positively associated with economic diversification. While this nexus is weak under Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimations, it is not the case with Three-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS). This suggests the need for prudence in estimation techniques when assessing the incidence of middle class. This correlation is weak (strong) when the TSLS (SUR) method is considered. Moreover, the middle class has a negative relationship with weak places in the classification of ease in doing business indicators. In other words, an increase would dynamically increase the climate of doing business. However, like for economic diversification, results are not consistently significant for the two estimation techniques. Hence, prudence is needed. Table 6 support the positions of these authors. While the results are a little counter-intuitive in that the effect increases from LM to UM, the overall element of consolation is that one should expect governance standards in African countries to improve with an evolving middle class. (Maupeu, 2012) , an important concern arising is to know whether such a scenario can be generalised.
In the short-term, our findings may not adequately and consistently validate the significant effect of the middle class on democracy and political stability in Africa. Moreover, it is very surprising to notice a negative sign flowing from the middle class to democracy.
This unexpected findings support the position of Jacquemot (2012, p. 26) in which the African middle class may have some political apathy.
Middle class and Macroeconomics
Political choice can also be determined by the social or middle class. According to Palma (2011) they affect domestic policies. Sound macroeconomic policies influence the constitution of this class, the author does not refute a reverse effect. While societies with a middle class consensus would device policies that facilitate economic prosperity, those polarised by classes and ethnic groups would opt for redistribution policies. Table 7 below shows the macroeconomic effects of the middle class and ethnic diversity, notably, on: budget management, inflation, economic vulnerability and openness.
While good budget management is associated with an increase in the size of the middle class, the nexus is not significant with SUR estimations. We find that inflation is negatively linked to the middle class, consistent with Easterly (2001) . This linkage has no statistical significance. We also notice a positive effect of the middle class on openness, which is significant only for MCWFC and FC. The middle class negatively affects economic vulnerability, with an increasing magnitude of negativity. Overall, the middle class is not uniform across macroeconomic variables. 
Development, modernisation and the middle class
It has been proven that, until the 19 th century, the middle class constituted a major driving force to economic development in Europe and North America (Adelman & Morris, 1997; . This thesis has been confirmed by Yuan et al. (2011) in relation to urbanisation/industrialisation in China. More developed societies have a tendency to move from agriculture towards the industry and services (Kongsamut et al., 1997) . A hypothesis confirmed by Easterly (2001) on the linkage between agriculture and the middle class. In other words, the middle class leads to economic sophistication. From Table 8 above, the middle class positively affects urbanisation and GDP per capita. These findings are consistently significant across specifications and estimation techniques. This is not the case with the effect on the 'value added by agriculture on GDP' in which with the SUR method, it is negatively affected by the middle class. The sign is positively insignificant with 3SLS, which could reflect some lack of robustness. Accordingly, the idea of a virtuous cycle between urbanisation and the middle class is not limited to only theory: an increasing middle class is translated by growth in the number of consumers. This has a positive effect on market size, a boom in the housing market and formalisation of the banking system in the economy. High mobility that follows increases economic activity which in turn enables cities to attract more ideas, growth of a certain class and profit associated with the rising class.
Conclusion
From our estimations, it could be established that GDP per capita and education affect all the middle class dependent variables. However, we have seen a negative nexus for the effect of ethnic fragmentation, political stability in general and partially for economic vulnerability.
Simple positive correlations have been observed for the size of the informal sector, openness and democracy.
We have also attempted to understand the consequences of an emerging middle class in the African social dynamic. We followed Easterly (2001) by using the 3SLS and SUR estimation techniques for this purpose. Our findings have shown that the middle class enables the accumulation of human (health, education and social protection) and infrastructural capital.
While its effect appears to be null on democracy and political stability in the short-term, it nonetheless enhances modernisation and better governance. In the absence of robustness, it is probable that increasing the middle class can substantially improve economic diversification and ease of doing business. At the macroeconomic level, economic vulnerability reduces with the growth of the middle class. While the nexus is not robust, its effect on budget management is positive. We have also noticed positive relations between the middle class and openness, though the nexus is very unstable. Middle class is negatively linked to inflation, albeit not significant.
The advantages above justify the policy interest of stimulating the middle class.
Hence, in light of our findings, such policies should target above all, GDP per capita growth and education. These policies should also be tailored such that, the most is reaped from ethnic fragmentation, especially that which curtails its probability of negative incidence. Moreover, policies that directly target the mitigation of economic vulnerability are worthwhile. Lastly, the ongoing democratisation process in Africa offers opportunities for the growth of the middle class.
